Boise IMT Aids in Greensburg Tornado Relief
A weekend of severe weather battered southwest Kansas, beginning May 4. A 1.7-mile-wide wedge tornado hit the town of Greensburg. The EF-5 tornado passed through Greensburg with winds in excess of 200mph and resulted in 10 fatalities and 95% destruction of Greensburg.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency tasked the U.S. Forest Service Rocky Mountain Region ESF-4 with organizing and establishing a base camp to support 300 emergency responders in the Greensburg area. On May 6, FEMA Branch Chief Bryon Grable approved a mission assignment for a full-service base camp with an Incident Management Team for an initial period of 60 days and an estimated cost of $4 million.
On May 7, Regional Forester Representative Joe Hartman and FEMA Logistics Section Chief Dick Harrington in Greensburg conducted an in-brief and issued the delegation of authority and mission assignment. From these documents the Boise incident commander set the following priorities:
Facilitate the security and safety of emergency responders while utilizing camp facilities.
Provide quality meals that are nutritionally balanced and pleasing to the pallet.
Provide lodging that allows for quiet and restful sleeping conditions.
Provide hygienic services including hand-wash stations, showers, toilet facilities and laundry services.
Provide a training opportunity to build ICS capability and capacity for the San Juan Interagency Hot Shot Crew.
Coordinate with Americorp concerning the community use of the Red and White tarp adjacent to the base camp in Davis Park.
Eventually, more than 4,000 resident stays were recorded throughout the duration of the incident. The task was to provide 10,000 resident stays. The base camp was only housing at 38% of the capacity.
The assigned mission was achieved May 8, when the first meals were served. The scope, complexity and necessity to support emergency responders remained steadfast throughout the 35-day assignment.
The base camp served more than 36,000 meals, averaging 1,000 meals per day. The task was to serve 300 emergency responders, or 900 meals per day. The actual feeding exceeded the capacity by 20%.
A supplemental task was developed May 21, to lease and provide five buses with drivers for evacuation of emergency workers in the event of additional severe weather. After the initial three-day period from May 21 to 23, the buses were on a recall status subject to National Weather Service forecasts. This supplemental added the authority to spend an additional $50,000.
The 2007 National Mobilization Guide outlines the mobilization process for National Incident Management Organization teams. Due to the nature of incidents, team configuration is negotiated by National Multiagency Coordination Center, nimo incident commander, and the requesting Geographic Area Coordination Center. To increase personnel capacity and capability, trainees, apprentices, and/or technical specialists may be ordered for any or all positions.
Strength of the Boise IMT lies in its ability to tailor the organizational response based on the needs of the incident. For this incident, the team responded with the seven command and general staff positions, which were supplemented by a pre-order placed by Pueblo Dispatch for several logistics and finance unit leader positions. In a study of the most effective organization, the team determined the optimal organization to be seven to 19 positions. As the incident developed, part of the Boise IMT's approach was to be “special forces,” where members took on duties beyond the normal scope of their positions. For example, the finance section chief took on demobilization and resource duties, and operations completed situation and human-resource tasks.
Under Unified Command, the Boise incident commander participated in meetings with FEMA, state and local government IMTs on an as needed basis. These meetings coordinated the long-term base camp needs and outcomes for finishing the mission assignment in a timely and cost efficient manner.
On May 28, FEMA and the Greensburg IMT re-evaluated the need to continue the response phase of the operations. Gas leaks, water contamination and limited power supply were issues persistent within the city limits. The decision was for 140 responders to remain through June 4, based on the need to secure the infrastructure of the community.
A suggestion for the next FEMA incident is for FEMA to send a cadre of personnel to be trained in command, staff and unit leader positions for mentoring by the nimo IMT. In the future the nimo incident commander, regional forester's representative and ESF-4 representatives ought to set this in motion. These actions will serve to increase the incident management capability and capacity nationwide.
FEMA and the Greensburg IMT again re-evaluated the situation on May 30. This evaluation determined that the demobilization of local workers and remobilization of the National Guard would occur June 4.
On June 6, FEMA and the Greensburg IMT decided to extend the base camp for emergency workers until June 11. This decision was made due to the lack of other housing.
Greensburg IMT, through an incident action plan objective, stated that the response phase would end June 30 and the recovery phase would be transferred to Kiowa County and the town of Greensburg on July 1.
The initial evacuation and accountability plan was prepared in collaboration with the incident meteorologist and completed on May 9. Due to the large number of responders in the area and limited storm shelters identified, avoidance was chosen as the evacuation tactic.
Responder population in town decreased while the population of residents in the base camp increased. The team established coordination with the Greensburg IMT, evaluated and established shelters, and wrote a new evacuation plan. The plan was updated to ensure command and control, and to mitigate the potential life hazards. The team also ordered buses to accommodate all base camp personnel and briefed residents and base camp personnel with a one-page evacuation protocol.
On May 24, the incident meteorologist issued a severe weather warning, which initiated evacuation of the base camp. The wind speed reached 50mph with heavy rain. The orderly evacuation of 268 camp personnel took approximately 20 minutes. Approximately 20 personnel from the community shared the shelter during the 90-minute evacuation. The incident meteorologist gave an all-clear and everyone returned to camp.
On May 31, the incident meteorologist declared another weather watch. All base camp personnel were notified and reminded of their responsibilities associated with an ordered evacuation.
On June 5, the team developed an addendum to modify the bus transportation and travel route. With the decrease in base camp residents, the team eliminated the contract buses, as there were sufficient vehicles in the camp to safely accommodate all personnel. The team also adjusted the evacuation route because a road block was being constructed along the established evacuation route to prevent tourists from traveling through Greensburg.
This assignment facilitated training for 12 personnel with 14 position task books from four agencies. Seven of the trainees completed task books and were recommended for qualification.
Seventy-nine percent of those trainees came from federal agencies, 14% from Kansas State Forest Service and 7% from local government.
The Boise IMT initiated a new national wildland fire leadership training program with the San Juan Hot Shots. Eleven of the San Juan Hotshots were paired with and worked along side Boise IMT personnel to gain an understanding of day-to-day command and control functions.
This was a unique opportunity to initiate a pilot leadership training program and to spark interest in firefighters and mid-level crew managers to pursue command and general staff qualifications.
The Greensburg Tornado FEMA Assist after-action review roll-up was submitted to the Wildfire Lessons Learned Center by the Boise Incident Management Team. For the complete text, visit www.wildfirelessonslearned.net.
