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Russian Disarray


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Wildfire prevention and suppression have taken a turn for the worse in Russia, a problem that has been discussed openly in the Russian press. Even more conversation is needed to encourage positive shifts in Russian forest and fire management.

This article is also available in Chinese (中文) and French (français).

According to the Russian Federation's national weather and water prediction center, the Hydrometcenter, most regions of Russia will experience temperatures close to their long-term annual average or higher from April to September this year. Based on these weather projections, there is a 72% probability that Russia will experience increased fire danger in the Ural, Siberian and Volga federal districts from May through September.

So what can we expect from the 2010 fire season in Russia? Before answering that question, let's first take a look at fire statistics of the previous year. According to M.D. Giryaev, vice head of the Federal Forestry Agency, the 2009 fire season saw more than 22,000 wildland fires that covered about 6 million acres. The Federal Forestry Agency is responsible for the management of 94% of Russian forests.

A number of factors contributed to the fire workload in 2009. According to Giryaev, the major factors were:

Poor air support. Air patrol started later than expected because of late aircraft rental contracts, and air patrol frequency was lower than normal, leading to delayed fire detection and fires spreading over large areas. Five to 10 years ago, the average number of annual air patrol hours was 100,000; during the last two years, it was reduced to 15,000. Compare this figure to the standard 75,000 hours in Greece, 350,000 hours in the United States and 175,000 hours in Canada. Regional aviation bases almost stopped using Mi-8 helicopters and Be-12 and An-2 aircraft, as well as other firefighting equipment and retardants. In addition, most regions experienced a breakdown in coordination between aviation forest protection and the land forces. One notable exception was the creation of a specialized training center for forest fire specialists and pilot-observers under the jurisdiction of the Central Forest Protection Airbase of Avialesookhrana in Moscow.

Poor preventive treatments. There was insufficient cooperation of the state forest sector with local governments in terms of preventive fuel treatment. Traditionally in Russia, numerous organizations and officials have varying responsibilities for and oversight of wildland fire suppression. However, recent reforms in the forest sector have almost paralyzed forest protection in Russia; the Avialesookhrana is now decentralized and feeble. As a result, wildfires are fought only when they reach large sizes or threaten inhabited localities.

Inefficient use of remote-sensing information. Official statistics indicate that 5 million acres are burned annually in Russia, but non-official statistics, such as those from Greenpeace, estimate that up to 35 million acres are burned. According to Greenpeace, about one-third of Russian forests (500 million acres) are not included in the zone of forest fire protection and do not have reliable fire statistics. In 2009, the Federal Forestry Agency started to evaluate the forest fire situation in Russia through remote-sensing systems. As a result, 10 regions (out of 84) were found to have understated their burned areas.

Limited ability to move fire-fighting resources. The difficulty of moving resources among regions was addressed when the Federal Forestry Agency developed a relevant program that was approved by the Russian Emergency Ministry, Nature Ministry and Transportation Ministry. However, the decision was not accepted at the level of the Russian Federation government because of its disapproval by the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, which ultimately must approve funding.

Financial issues. In 2009, facts of misuse and ineffective use of relevant funds were disclosed.


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